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ance contract. The instant case, therefore, is in conflict with Underwood v.
Fortune. It clearly adopts the Rhode Island rule, not heretofore followed
in Missouri. Perhaps the equitable viewpoint and sound public policy recog-
nized in recent cases between vendor and purchaser's are preferable. At
any rate the supreme court of this state must now determine whether the
Massachusetts or Rhode Island doctrine shall prevail. S. R. S.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--BANKRUPTCY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-[Fed-
eral].-The National Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 19371 has, unlike the
Act of 1934, been upheld. 2 The new Act, like the old, permits municipalities
to institute voluntary proceedings in courts of bankruptcy. The Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation District filed a voluntary petition under the Act,
sufficiently alleging insolvency and other requisite matters. The district
court, feeling bound by Ashton v. Cameron County District,3 which had
declared the Act of 19344 to be invalid, dismissed the petition and declared
the new statute also to be unconstitutional. The United States Supreme
Court in reversing the lower court held the new Act to be neither violative
of the Fifth Amendment nor an unconstitutional interference with the es-
sential sovereignty of the states.
The two acts differ in few respects. The machinery provided in them
is essentially similar. The original Act lumped political subdivisions to-
gether with non-political ones, while the new Act lists them separately.
The Ashton case had declared the earlier Act to be unconstitutional be-
cause the statute applied to political districts and therefore interfered with
the political powers of the State. It was thought by some that separate
listing of the various subdivisions of the state to which the new Act would
apply would allow the courts to circumvent the Ashton case by making use
of the separability clause and thereby declaring the new Act constitutional
as to the non-political subdivisions.5 But the Supreme Court did not dis-
tinguish between the new statute's applicability to political and to non-
political subdivisions. It should be noted further that the Lindsay-Strath-
more Irrigation District had once been held to be a political subdivision by
the Supreme Court of California,6 and federal courts are required to adopt
that interpretation of the district's status.7 The only other substantial
15. Mahan v. The Home Insurance Co. of N. Y. (1920) 205 Mo. App.
592, 226 S. W. 593; Standard Oil Co. v. Dye (1929) 223 Mo. App. 926, 20
S. W. (2d) 946.
1. (1937) 50 Stat. 653, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. sees. 401-404.
2. United States v. Bekins (1938) 58 S. Ct. 811, 82 L. ed. 751.
3. (1936) 298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. 1309.
4. (1934) 48 Stat. 798, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. secs. 301-303.
5. Black, Has Congress Circumvented the Ashton Decision? (1937) 23
A. B. A. J. 683.
6. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Ct. (1920) 182 Cal.
315, 187 Pac. 1056.
7. Claiborne County v. Brooks (1884) 111 U. S. 400, 4 S. Ct. 489, 28
L. ed 470; Railroad Commission v. Los Angeles R. Corp. (1929) 280 U. S.
145, 50 S. Ct. 71, 74 L. ed. 234.
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difference between the two laws is that the unconstitutional one provided
for "readjustment," while the valid law spoke of "composition," thereby
emphasizing the voluntary or consent aspect of the law. But the Supreme
Court went out of its way to say that consent by the state has nothing
to do with the law's validity.
In view of the fact that the Court did not place its holding in the in-
stant case on either of the two grounds of difference between the statutes,
it would seem that the Court has reversed itself and, in effect, adopted the
view of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Ashton case. A new emphasis upon the
need for relieving the states of the burden of their obligations and the
changed composition of the Court would seem to account for the changed
attitude. W. B. M.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCF---LIABILITY OF AUTOmOBILE DEALER FOR DEFECTS IN
DEMONSTRATOR CAR-[Missouri].-Defendant automobile dealer lent a car
to a prospective purchaser for the purpose of a demonstration. While the
latter was taking his wife for a drive, an accident occurred in which the
wife was injured. She sued the dealer, alleging that the accident was due
to defective brakes, caused by the seepage of grease from the wheel bear-
ings on to the brake lining. Held, plaintiff could not recover, there being
no evidence that the dealer had not made a reasonable inspection.1
In reaching its decision the court adopted the rule as to the liability of
a vendor of a chattel, seemingly on the assumption that there was a sale.2
In general, the vendor of a chattel is under no duty to test articles manu-
factured or packed by others for the purpose of discovering latent defects
and is not liable for injuries resulting from such defects unless he has
actual knowledge thereof.3 The rule has been qualified by two exceptions
in which the vendor is under a duty to make a reasonable inspection: (1)
where there is something which reasonably tends to call attention to pos-
sible defects;4 and (2) where the article being sold is such as becomes
dangerous through defects. 5 The court in the instant case held that the
dealer owed some duty of inspection to the plaintiff because the article
being sold was unusually complicated, thus in effect placing the instant case
within the second exception noted.
1. Shroder v. Baron Dady Motor Co. (Mo. 1937) 111 S. W. (2d) 66.
2. See also Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. (1930) 99 Cal. App. 795, 290 Pac.
919, where the court applied the sale theory in determining the vendor's
duty toward a prospective purchaser of a washing machine.
3. Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. (1930) 99 Cal. App. 795, 290 Pac. 919;
Craig v. Baker & Holmes Co. (1923) 85 Fla. 373, 96 So. 93; Segal v. Carrol
Furniture Co. (1935) 51 Ga. App. 191, 179 S. E. 775; Peaslee-Gaulbert Co.
v. McMath's Adm'r (1912) 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)
465, Ann. Cases 1913E 392; Simons v. Sun Ray Motor Co. (Sup. Ct. 1917)
162 N. Y. S. 968.
4. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis (1929) 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. 1190;
see Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 402.
5. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis (1929) 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. 1190;
Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r (1912) 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W.
770, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, Ann. Cases 1913E 392.
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